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Abstract Technologies fulﬁll a social role in the sense that they inﬂuence the
moral actions of people, often in unintended and unforeseen ways. Scientists and
engineers are already accepting much responsibility for the technological, eco-
nomical and environmental aspects of their work. This article asks them to take an
extra step, and now also consider the social role of their products. The aim is to
enable engineers to take a prospective responsibility for the future social roles of
their technologies by providing them with a matrix that helps to explore in advance
how emerging technologies might plausibly affect the reasons behind people’s
(moral) actions. On the horizontal axis of the matrix, we distinguished the three
basic types of reasons that play a role in practical judgment: what is the case, what
can be done and what should be done. On the vertical axis we distinguished the
morally relevant classes of issues: stakeholders, consequences and the good life. To
illustrate how this matrix may work in practice, the ﬁnal section applies the matrix
to the case of the Google PowerMeter.
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Introduction
Things bite back, as Edward Tenner explained (1997). Especially technological
things. When new technologies are introduced on the market, they rarely behave as
hoped. Often they have unintended and unforeseen side effects. These side effects
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ones ‘‘revenge effects’’. For instance, one of the aims of introducing computers on
the work ﬂoor was to reduce paperwork. In reality both the work and the paper
increased vastly. The new computing technologies, which facilitate easy storage of
data and easy printing of documents, interacted with the working habits of the
majority of people who like to read from paper. As Tenner’s extensive research
shows, the result was that signiﬁcantly more paper was used, and bureaucracy
increased because of the many additional ways to collect, store and rework data
(Tenner 1997). Another well-known example of a revenge effect is the energy
saving light bulbs of the 1990s. Designed to decrease energy consumption, the
technology achieved the opposite (Achterhuis 1998; Weegink 1996). Such light
bulbs are expensive to buy, but cheap to use. Consequently, many people started to
use these bulbs for lighting places that used to be dark (like gardens and corridors)
and so the energy consumption increased.
In these two examples the ‘‘revenge effect’’ occurred because the new technology
led to unforeseen changes in behavior in users. In this way, Tenner’s analysis draws
our attention to the social role of technologies. Technologies affect our values, our
standards, our expectations, our goals, our hopes, our routines, and so on. Of course,
this social role of technology does not by deﬁnition result in revenge effects, nor is
this role always negative or unintended. Sometimes the social role is negative, but
without thwarting the intended goal of the technology. An automatic door groom
makes it harder to pass through the door with a wheelchair and thus may have a
discriminating effect, but it does do the work it was intended to do: closing the door
(Latour 1992). In other cases the unintended consequences are ethically neutral or
their desirability is open for debate. For instance, a remote control is not simply a
means to switch channels. It changes the ends of the television watcher as it invites a
different way of watching television. Many hours are now spent zapping through the
channels, hoping for news items or for some entertainment. Again, in other cases,
technology’s social role has unintended but beneﬁcial impacts, as in the case of cell
phones causing adolescents to spend a smaller percentage of their allowance on
smoking (Kaur 2002; Irvine 2003; Selian 2004). And often the social role is not
unintended at all. For instance, designers usually have presumptions about the
practices of the user (Akrich 1992). The artifacts they design therefore inﬂuence the
behavior of the users. Consider, for instance, the height of the average kitchen top.
As a result, they are just too low to provide a comfortable working position for
many North European men. In this way, they reinforce the sexist idea that women
belong in the kitchen. In this case, technology’s social role is inspired by traditional
ideas on the division of roles between men and women.
To what extent engineers can be held accountable for the social roles of their
artifacts is a complex question. Behavioral changes are rarely if ever caused by
technology in a fully deterministic fashion. As a rule, words like ‘facilitate’,
‘provoke’ or ‘invite’ more adequately express the kind of causal relation between
technology and behavior that constitutes technology’s social role. This means that
the engineer is never solely accountable for the social role of her technology—that
accountability is almost by deﬁnition shared by the users and other actors. Nor is it
clear from a democratic point of view that we as a society want engineers to
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only a few people? But we leave these larger questions for another article and argue
that engineers have at least a co-responsibility, and it is this co-responsibility on
which we focus in this article.
We propose to expand the engineer’s responsibility to the morally relevant social
roles of technologies. Scientists and engineers are already accepting much respon-
sibility, for the technological and economical aspects of their work. Increasingly they
also consider the environmental impacts of their technologies. We ask them to take a
step further and now also consider the social role of their products.
Here, responsibility does not refer to liability issues or obligations, as is common
in ethics. In the case of liability, being responsible refers to being the rightful target
of responsive attitudes: you have done some right or wrong for which you ought to
be praised or blamed. The terms ‘‘praise’’ and ‘‘blame’’ are commonly used
retrospectively, after the actions have taken place and when it has become clear
what the consequences are, while we are more interested in the question of how
engineers could try to prevent undesired consequences. Obligations stress that you
are being responsible for something in the sense that it is your duty to do certain
things. Such obligations can be assigned prospectively, but only if it is clear what a
responsible action is. This is often unclear when discussing the future social role of
new technologies or new uses for technologies, and so duties cannot be deﬁned.
So taking a forward looking responsibility here means exploring what the social
role of a technology might be. But how can engineers take such a responsibility?
This article aims to support engineers in taking a prospective responsibility for the
future social roles of their technologies. Not in the sense of liability (blame or praise
after the act), but in the sense of carrying out a reﬂective analysis with ‘‘explicit
consideration of ethical issues’’ (Mitcham 1997). Taking responsibility in this
proactive sense means recognizing that your actions can make a future difference
(no matter how local), making the effort to ﬁnd out what is a good thing to do and
acting according to those ﬁndings.
Carl Mitcham argued that technology practitioners should have tools that are
‘‘sufﬁcientlycomplextoinclude adiversityofnon-standardtechnicalfactors’’p.275.
In our words: they need a framework for exploring the future social role of
technologies. Of course, we cannot offer them a crystal ball. Part of the social role of
new technologies will always emerge unexpectedly. But we are not condemned to
grope in the dark, either. In this article we provide responsible engineers with an
anticipatorymatrixthathelpstoexploreinadvancehowemergingtechnologiesmight
plausibly affect the reasons behind people’s (moral) actions. Again, this matrix is not
meanttocoverallresponsibilitiesofengineers:itismeanttoenableengineerstotakea
forward responsibility for the possible social role of technologies, in addition to their
other responsibilities such as ensuring environmental, safety and economical issues.
The Technological Mediation of Morality: A Matrix
Bruno Latour has pointed out that technologies can ‘‘authorize, allow, afford,
encourage, permit, suggest, inﬂuence, block, render possible, forbid, and so on’’
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been carried out demonstrating how technologies indeed mediate human actions.
Several authors have developed phenomenological (Idhe 1993; Verbeek 2006),
sociological (Latour 1992, 2005) or pragmatist (Keulartz et al. 2002) approaches for
understanding how technologies do this. We build on this work.
But these approaches need further speciﬁcation. Often the social role of
technologies is described as if we were dealing with the impact of a technical object
on a human object. However, an object cannot take moral responsibility: they only
perform actions in the sense of reactions. Humans are distinct from objects because
they have reasons for their actions and they can reﬂect on these reasons.
Technologies affect our actions not just by altering the course of action (like billiard
balls do to each other) but by mediating our reasons or motives to act in a particular
way (Waelbers forthcoming).
How exactly do technologies mediate our reasons for actions? A fruitful way to
explore this mediation starts by distinguishing three types of reasons on which
people base their practical judgments: What ‘‘is’’ the situation? What ‘‘can’’ one do?
And what ‘‘ought’’ one to do, given this situation and these possibilities? (Waelbers
forthcoming) All three types of reasons can be mediated by technology. For
instance, our factual beliefs are closely related to how we perceive the world. Don
Ihde explains how technologies mediate such perceptions (Idhe 1993). New
technologies (for instance the microscope) changed our observations (the micro-
perceptions) which then caused our factual ideas to alter (for instance our ideas
about hygiene). Technologies disclose reality in new ways. But it should be realized
that technologies not only make new aspects of reality visible, but sometimes also
hide parts of reality. Car drivers, for instance, miss out on a whole lot of reality that
is accessible to the cyclist. Secondly, technologies mediate what our practical
options are, thus affecting our answers to the question ‘what can one do’. In fact,
technology’s overarching promise is to create new practical options, thus enlarging
our freedom. But again, technologies not only create options, they also remove or
modify existing ones. Cars may offer the opportunity to travel from A to B, but they
make it difﬁcult to enjoy peace and quiet. A third category of practical reasons are
based on what we believe we ought to do. We refrain from or pursue certain actions
because they conform or conﬂict with our values. Our ideas on what we ought to do
can also be mediated by technologies. For example, our ideas on the desirable social
roles of women are co-shaped by innovations like the contraceptive pill, condoms,
the washing machine and the microwave. Technologies call forth new goals and
duties, or help to make them obsolete.
In short: technologies mediate what we believe to be the case, what we believe to
be possible and what we believe to be desirable. And by mediating these beliefs,
technology mediates the actions based upon these beliefs. It is not clear that the
technologist should try to anticipate such mediations, as these might be trivial or
non-consequential. But when our ‘‘is-, can-, and ought-beliefs’’ are technologically
mediated in a morally relevant manner, it is important that engineers and scientists
are enabled to take a prospective responsibility. But when is the technological
mediation of our is-, can-, and ought-beliefs morally relevant? This question can be
answered from three different perspectives: from the perspective of the
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a good life (Swierstra 2010; Swierstra and Rip 2007).
First, the interests and rights of our fellow-beings should be taken seriously when
deciding how to act.
1 The concept ‘stakeholder’ is used to mark out those parties
affected by an actor’s practical choices. Of course, as the actors have rights and
interests—a ‘stake’—too, they will often be stakeholders themselves as well, but
this is not necessarily the case. Stakeholders have a ‘stake’ in our (in)actions, and a
moral claim on us, e.g. to be treated fairly, to be helped, or to have an explanation
for why we chose to do what we did. When deciding how to act morally, it is
therefore always necessary to identify such stakeholders and their interests and
rights. And if our perception of who the stakeholders are was to change, so would
our moral judgment. For instance, when parents know that a toy is cheap because it
is made in a factory that employs 8-year-olds who work 12 h a day, 7 days a week,
they may be less inclined to buy it for the amusement of their own 8-year-old.
Secondly, acting morally implies trying to anticipate the consequences of our
(non)actions, and to establish whether these are morally desirable (obligatory) or
not. Realizing that our action does not have the intended consequences, commonly
leads to changing our moral assessment of that action. Now that people know CO2
emissions are causing climate change, they are trying to decrease the emissions.
Finally, morality also pertains to the question of how to live a good life, even if in
contemporary, pluralistic, liberal societies, this question has to a considerable extent
been banned from the public domain (Swierstra 2002, 2009; Waelbers and Briggle
2010). However, insofar our aims central to what we consider essential to human
ﬂourishing change, our conception of the good does too (Swierstra 2010). Technol-
ogiestypicallypromisetohelprealizeourgoalsmoreefﬁciently,tosatisfyourdesires,
todiminishsufferingandpain,andsoforth.Buttheyalsohelpdeﬁnethosegoals,they
create new desires, new forms of pain and suffering, and so forth (Jonas 1984).
The distinct types of reasons and moral perspectives allow us to formulate a
general answer to the question of which technological mediations are morally
relevant and thus of particularly interest to engineers aiming to expand their
responsibility for the future social roles of their technologies. First they should ask
how their products might affect established beliefs about is, can and ought, and then,
in a second step, focus on those situations where the mediation of those beliefs
effect changes in prevailing perceptions of stakeholders, consequences, or the good
life, as these mediations pertain directly to moral judgment.
This is of course a complex endeavor. Therefore, we have constructed the
following matrix (see Table 1) to help people enquire what the possible morally
relevant, social role of the technologies might be. On the horizontal axis, we
distinguished the three basic types of reasons that play a role in practical judgment,
and on the vertical axis we distinguished the variables of moral judgment.
The upcoming subsections illustrate each box of this table. Note that for each
point, technologies can simultaneously work to increase or decrease, expand or
1 This holds both for deontological and consequentialist approaches in ethics, as it does for virtue ethics.
The differences between these ethical schools are only to be found after having established the
stakeholders and the consequences of our actions.
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stakeholder is deﬁned as someone who suffers or enjoys the consequences of our
(non)actions, or, vice versa, morally relevant consequences are deﬁned in terms of
whether they affect stakeholders or not, the ﬁrst two rows of the matrix closely hang
together and mirror each other.
Stakeholders
Behaving in a moral manner implies that one takes into account the consequences of
one’s (non)actions for other parties, the stakeholders. The ﬁrst row of our matrix
helps explore how new technologies mediate the relation between the technology
user and the stakeholders.
Ad 1a. Presence
We begin by asking how a technology affects the beliefs of the user concerning the
factual world. Many technologies disclose the world to our senses, e.g. by making
far removed stars or nearby nanoparticles visible. But as we are interested here in
such disclosure only in as far as it is morally relevant, we ask in particular how
technology can affect beliefs about the presence (or absence) of stakeholders.
Technology can sometimes make actors more aware of stakeholders. For example:
Verbeek explained how ultrasound technologies changed the moral status of the
fetus and the experience of pregnancy for both parents and grandparents by making
the fetus visible (Verbeek 2008). Another example is the television: this technology
has made the citizens of afﬂuent Western societies acutely aware of the poverty of
many people in developing countries (Boltanski 1993). By presenting stakeholders,
technology can make users aware of their presence. The awareness of stakeholders’
presence is morally relevant, as it is a precondition for taking their interests and
rights into account.
But technologies can also decrease our moral involvement with other
stakeholders by making users less aware of their presence. Gu ¨nther Anders (Anders
1980/1956) described how technologies affect our empathy in a macabre way when
he discussed the bombing of Hiroshima. To drop a bomb, the pilot only has to press
a button. He neither has to face the victims nor the consequences of his action.
Without hearing or seeing the impact, he is able to kill millions of people, while, as
Anders claims, listening to classical music. This is a completely different experience
than killing someone from close by (van Dijk 2000).
Table 1 Matrix for the technological mediation of morality
a. Is b. Can c. Ought
1. Stakeholders Presence Empowerment Rights
2. Consequences Anticipatory knowledge Practical affordances Responsibilities
3. Good life Contingency Freedom Flourishing
Matrix for the prospective discussion of the moral role of technologies. The horizontal axis represents the
three types of reasons for action and the vertical axis represents the points of moral focus
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Typically technology promises to empower the user to do things previously beyond
her or his power. When trying to anticipate how new technologies might affect the
beliefs of actors and (other) stakeholders, it is fruitful to analyze these shifts in
(relative) power as they determine to a large extent what actors believe to be
possible. This is morally relevant when these newfound powers affect the moral
sensitivity of the agent to the fate of the stakeholders in a positive or negative way.
For instance, being aware of the presence of stakeholders is a necessary but not a
sufﬁcient condition to propel people into action. A further precondition is that one
believes that one is in a position to do something positive for that stakeholder. This
is where technology plays a major role. It can help establish the belief that, yes, one
can do something for others. The existence of the telephone or Internet, for instance,
enables one to wire money to those in need when they are far removed from us. The
availability of medical instruments can cause us to no longer accept suffering and
death, but to do something about it.
A speciﬁc case is when the technology user herself is the main stakeholder. In
that case technology does not empower her to help others, but to help herself.
Another word for such self-help is emancipation. For example: now a wealth of
information on medical issues can be found on the Internet, many patients develop
clear ideas about how to further their legitimate self-interest. (Van Rijen 2005). This
immediately affects the power balance between doctor and patient, as it decreases
the autonomy of the ﬁrst and increases the autonomy of the latter.
But technology can also increase our possibilities in such a way that we become
less concerned with what our actions entail for others. When listening to an mp3
player, people are less inclined to make small talk to others using public transport
and behave more ‘‘autistic’’.
Ad 1c. Rights
By making a technology user aware of the presence of stakeholders, and by opening
up practical avenues to take the interests and rights of those stakeholders into
account, technology can, and often does, motivate the user to act on behalf of those
stakeholders. But technology not only discloses stakeholders’ rights to the user, it
can also help to create new stakeholder rights. These rights then inﬂuence the
actor’s belief in what ought to be done and what not. Which rights are and which are
not acknowledged may be mediated by technologies because new options arise or
existing options become less attractive. We have already mentioned that the
acknowledgement of women’s rights was co-shaped by developments in birth
control technologies. Another example is provided by the Dutch social security
system: people who need social security for a substantial period of time now have
the legal and moral right to receive regular subsidies to buy a washing machine,
television, computer or refrigerator. Such devices have now come to be considered
as essential for people to function well in society.
But with the acknowledgement of new rights (such as the right to certain
information or the right to treatment), other rights may be contested. How long will
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government agencies or assurance companies by means of information written on
paper, rather than through the Internet? When the ﬁrst genetic test for Huntington
disease was under development, people who were at risk of developing this
neurological disease were asked whether they wanted to be tested when the
diagnostics became available (Burgh 1997; Tibben et al. 1997). Many of the
respondents worried that testing might also reveal genetic information to family
members who claimed the right ‘‘not to know’’. Others argued that the right ‘‘to
know’’ was more important since it enabled them to adopt a lifestyle that ﬁtted their
prospects. These rights to know and not to know did not exist before the
introduction of the test. Previously, due to the lack of technological means, all
members of the risk group were necessarily condemned to ‘‘not to know’’.
Consequences
Morality has to do with intentional behavior, this means that it is goal directed and
that consequences matter. The second row of our matrix helps explore how new
technologies mediate the relation between the technology user and the consequences
of her action.
Ad 2a. Anticipatory knowledge
The introduction of a new technology can change the factual beliefs of the users, as
the consequences of their actions may become illuminated or blurred from view by
the employment of these technologies. Many technologies make us more aware of
the consequences of our actions, for instance by measuring the impacts (such as
energy meters) or by enabling us to observe the impacts (such as microscopes).
But many technologies have the opposite effect: they change our factual beliefs
by making us less aware of the consequences of our actions. More particularly:
many modern technologies conceal their environmental consequences from our
sight. They do this for instance by taking over certain tasks we would previously
perform ourselves. As we no longer chop our own wood, we do not witness the
deforesting effect of our wood consumption. The central heating systems of houses
and ofﬁces do not reveal what the effects are on the landscapes. Our sewer systems
hide the water pollution our household causes from view since we no longer have to
clean out our cesspits and dunghills.
Ad 2b. Practical Affordances
The link between intended outcomes and realized consequences is uncertain at best,
as we can learn from any deontologist critiquing consequentialist forms of ethics.
Often we lack the necessary means of control to ensure that what we intend to
happen will happen. However, technologies can and often do increase our
possibilities of inﬂuencing those outcomes. The promise to create new practical
affordances underlies almost all technological expectations, and often for good
reasons. Contraception technologies, for instance, increased our possibilities to
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reach friends and colleagues wherever they may happen to ﬁnd themselves. In this
way, technology helps to establish the belief that it is possible to intervene
successfully in our world.
However, creating new possibilities is not all that technologies do. As a rule, after
a new artifact has been introduced into society, we ﬁnd out that it now rules out
certain practical options that were previously available. A woman who does not
want to have intercourse with her partner, for example, can no longer use the
‘threat’ of becoming pregnant. Or someone who may not want to be reachable all
the time and everywhere, may soon ﬁnd herself to be a social outcast since so many
of our social interactions are now coordinated by mobile phone.
Ad 2c. Responsibilities
Technologies can increase or decrease both our knowledge of our actions’
consequences as well as our ability to inﬂuence those consequences. These changes
directly translate into our moral responsibilities (de Vries 1989). In our society, a
doctor who knows how to cure a patient and is in the position to do so (e.g. by
having the necessary instruments or medication available), is under the prima facie
obligation to do so. The more powerful technology makes us, the greater our
responsibilities. Hume famously told his readers that ‘Ought implies Can’. But the
philosophy of technology teaches us that the reverse is also often true: ‘Can implies
Ought’. With new powers come new responsibilities. In this vein, technologically
mediated knowledge of, and control over, the consequences of our actions, affects
our beliefs about what we ought to do, and what not.
What receives less attention, however, is that technologies can also work to
reduce our responsibilities. Firstly, technology can make the consequences of our
actions harder to know, and it is difﬁcult to take responsibility for consequences you
do not know about. For example: in modern food production, technology has
acquired such a dominant role that food has to a large extent become black-boxed.
Consumers hardly know where their food comes from any more, or how it is
produced and processed. For this reason, technology has made it much harder for
consumers to consume ‘‘responsibly’’ as they literally do not know what they are
eating (Waelbers et al. 2004). Another example: technology tends to make processes
so complex and multi-layered, involving so many different actors, that the
possibilities of inﬂuencing this system are greatly reduced. This makes it difﬁcult, if
not impossible, for individual actors to accept moral responsibility. Furthermore, we
delegate an increasing number of tasks and duties to technologies (Waelbers 2009).
If these technologies fail, people often argue that this is a technological and not a
moral problem (Waelbers 2002). We have for instance delegated the delivery of our
mail to computers, servers and software such as Microsoft Outlook. If a message
fails to arrive, people tend to blame it on the technology.
2 So, in all these cases the
2 Of course, this is not to say that ‘blaming technology’ always works. If it was an important message,
you could also have made a phone call or (if written communication is preferred), you could have double-
checked whether the message has been received.
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control, they are under no moral obligation to do something about them.
Good Life
The third row of the matrix addresses the inﬂuence of technologies on our
perceptions, possibilities and assessment of the good life. Often such shifts result
from a combination of multiple technologies, but also individual technologies can
have a substantial effect.
Ad 3a. Contingency
New technologies affect established ideas about what is good to be and good to do.
First, they can do this by altering our perceptions of the place of humans within the
world. A common example to illustrate this point is the compass. This technological
device (together with many other sailing technologies) has contributed to the change
in the Europeans0 understanding of their position in the world and of (their own and
other people’s) culture. More generally, technology ﬁlls us with pride, and the
Promethean dream helps us believe that not even the sky is the limit. Technology
helps to undermine the belief that we are an integral part of a Normative Nature,
where everything and everyone has his or her own role to play. We marvel that we
can do and create everything we want, given sufﬁcient resources and time.
Documentaries such as the Discovery Channel’s ‘‘Mega-Structures’’ series testify to
the widely spread idea that we are masters of both nature and ourselves. There is no
pre-established order to obey. Technologies help establish the (essentially) humanist
belief that reality is contingent and open to revision.
But this coin has a ﬂipside. Another classic invention, the telescope, has
fundamentally altered our understanding of our place in the universe too, but in this
case the technology did not lead to pride, but rather to modesty. The telescope
ﬁrmly removed the earth—and us humans with it—from the centre of the universe.
And up until the present, technological developments continue to mediate our
perception of who we are. It is argued that neuro-science and neuro-technologies
show us that many of our actions are not ‘‘autonomous’’ in the enlightenment sense
of the word (Kalis et al. 2008). Many decisions are taken unconsciously (Broks
1997; Kalis et al. 2008). These technological developments are diminishing our
status and capacities as autonomous and moral persons: we are not the center of the
universe, created in the image of God, nor are we able to decide freely how to live
our lives. However, even if these technologies lead to factual beliefs that hardly
contribute to our sense of pride, they do not restore the previous concept of Nature
as a Benign Order. They too impress upon us the fact that we live in a contingent
universe.
Ad 3b. Freedom
A contingent world may have lost its sacral and ordered character, but it does open
up opportunities for action. Technologies create and limit our options to live what
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options to ﬁnd friends, jobs and leisure activities that suit your interests and outlook
on life. Society has become more ﬂuid, more mobile due to cars, trains and
airplanes. People who share the same interests can ﬁnd and contact each other easily
via the Internet, regardless of where they live. More fundamentally: with the
increased opportunities to shape your life rather than simply obey the role that is
connected to your given status in society, the dominant conception of the good life
has moved away from ‘obeisance’ towards ‘autonomy’ and an activist stance.
On the other hand, the increasing pressure for everyone to use Internet, to uphold
several e-mail accounts and to own a mobile phone severely limits people’s
freedom. If you want to participate in society, it is increasingly obligatory to
embrace these technologies and, with it, also many superﬂuous contacts and a
rushed lifestyle.
Ad 3c. Flourishing
By altering our perceptions and practical options, technologies also co-shape what
we believe to be virtuous. Foucault’s description of disciplining in schools made
clear that the classroom design and the chairs and desks enforce a certain physical
pose for the students (Foucault 1975), aimed at encouraging a certain moral pose or
attitude. The bodily position is closely linked to the attitude required for learning. A
few decennia ago, classrooms were designed in such a way that the students were
forced to sit up and look at the lecturer or teacher. The rooms and furniture did not
stimulate communication, but listening. There was little room to move and only
small desks were provided in order to make notes. This design was closely
connected to what was then believed to be good education, and the design co-shaped
the students’ attitudes.
Nowadays, complex, multimedia rooms are developed for education in which
large, wheeled tables and luxurious ofﬁce chairs are placed. These surroundings are
not only more comfortable, they also stimulate a pro-active learning attitude.
Students are no longer supposed to sit quietly and listen; they have to work on
projects, engage in debates and communicate with others. The virtuous present-day
student is unique, pro-active, assertive, communicative and collaborative, instead of
observational, timid, obedient, and solitary. The classrooms are designed to co-
shape these virtues of the students. In this case, there is a close relation between our
virtues and actions. The furniture determines the student’s ability to adopt a bodily
posture (a physical condition) that stimulates the attitude they occupy in relation to
each other and to the teacher. As a result, students are encouraged to act in a way
that is considered virtuous within the educational practice.
Taking Responsibility for Designing the Social Role of Technologies
In this section, we explain how the nine quadrants of the matrix can help actors to
explore the future mediation of the reasons for action of technologies. This is
important in order to be able to take a proactive responsibility for this mediating
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rather than on the actions themselves: it has the important advantage that it leaves
room for the agency of those affected by the technologies, rather than degrading
them to be passive ‘victims’ of the agency of technologies. Focusing on practical
reasons empowers people because they can play an active role in evaluating these
reasons. This evaluation is what we call practical reasoning or reﬂection. We
understand reasons and practical reasoning in a MacIntyrean sense (MacIntyre
1999). Alasdair MacIntyre distinguishes between having reasons and the activity of
practical reasoning. Although we are not aware of all our reasons for action, we can
work to take responsibility for our actions by using our faculty of practical
reasoning. In daily life, people can evaluate the reasons that are biologically or
socially given by standing back from them and thinking critically: ‘‘Am I going to
eat the last piece of pizza, or will I be wise and eat some fruit instead?’’ Similarly,
even when the reasons given by our biological condition and social surroundings are
technologically mediated, we can still apply our faculty of practical reasoning to
reﬂect on the desirability of our actions (Waelbers forthcoming). For instance, even
though communication and IT technologies provide us with fewer reasons to
actually meet with clients and colleagues, we can still ask ourselves whether it
would not be better in particular cases to meet these people in person.
In Table 2, we listed examples of questions that can be asked when discussing
the nine forms of mediation of reasons for actions. Of course, not all questions are
relevant for all technologies: it is a bit odd to question how a new espresso machine
alters people0s pride to be human.
Consider for instance the question of how the Google PowerMeter, launched in
2010, might mediate the reasons for actions of its users. The Google PowerMeter is
an online program that monitors the energy consumption of people who voluntarily
subscribe to this free service. Google describes its PowerMeter
3 as ‘‘a free energy
monitoring tool that helps you save energy and money. Using energy information
provided by utility smart meters and energy monitoring devices, Google Power-
Meter enables you to view your home’s energy consumption from anywhere
online.’’ After you install an electricity meter in your house that is connected with
the Internet, the Google software collects the required data, which is represented in
a graph. The software has six functionalities:
1. Track energy over time: a graph depicts how much energy the member has used
by the day, week or month
2. ‘Always on’ power: part of the graph shows power that is always on (standby
devices)
3. Predicting costs: estimation of the annual energy bill
4. Customized feedback: members can alter the cost per kWh to see the impact of
changes in energy prices, receive weekly emails, and share the usage with
family and friends
5. Budget tracker: members can set a personal energy saving goal and track their
progress
3 http://www.google.com/powermeter/about/about.html
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How can the matrix help to enquire what the likely mediating role of this
technology might be?
Consider the ﬁrst row of questions that concern the stakeholders. A quick
brainstorm on these questions reveals that the Google PowerMeter brings otherwise
invisible stakeholders to the fore, to make their presence felt. Friends and family can
see each other’s consumption levels, and become recognized as people who have a
stake (an interest) in keeping consumption down (1a). By customizing the Google
PowerMeter, friends and family cannot only see but also respond to your power
consumption. They are empowered as stakeholders as they can comment on your
choices and way of life (1b). It is likely that such a development can result in the
Table 2 Questions to ask with the help of the matrix
a. Is b. Can c. Ought
1. Stakeholders – Will the technology
mediate our perceptions
of the stakeholders?
– Will the technology
mediate the relationships
between the stakeholders?
– Will the technology
create new rights for
certain involved
stakeholders?
– Will the technology make
us more aware of the
presence of stakeholders?
– Will the technology
enlarge the power of the
involved stakeholders?
– Will the technology
work to diminish rights
for certain involved
stakeholders?
– Will the technology make
us less aware of the
presence of other
stakeholders?
– Will the technology
reduce the power of the
involved stakeholders?
2. Consequences – Will the technology
mediate the
consequences?
– Will the technology
mediate our options to
inﬂuence the
consequences?
– Will the technology
mediate our duties and
responsibilities?
– Will the consequences of
our actions become
illuminated by the new
technology?
– Will the technology
increase the possibility of
inﬂuencing the outcomes
of our actions?
– Will the technology
expand our duties and
responsibilities?
– Will the consequences of
our actions become
blurred from view by the
new technology?
– Will the technology
decrease the possibility of
inﬂuencing the outcomes
of our actions?
– Will the technology
lessen our duties and
responsibilities?
3. Good life – Will the technology
mediate our perception of
the good life?
– Will the technology
mediate our freedom to
live what we perceive to
be a good life?
– Will the technology
mediate our virtues?
– Will the technology
appeal to our pride?
– Will the technology
support our freedom?
– Will the technology
stimulate us to behave
virtuously?
– Will the technology
moderate to our pride?
– Will the technology limit
our freedom?
– Will the technology
frustrate us to behave
virtuously?
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Furthermore, when people can observe each other’s energy consumption, questions
about privacy rights are likely to arise (1c): ‘‘what were you doing at 02.00 am? You
really had a peak in energy consumption’’.
The questions on the consequences of the second row show that the mediation of
the consequences is likely to be ambiguous. Google PowerMeter visualizes, and
thus increases knowledge of, the ﬁnancial consequences of people’s energy
consumption (2a). In this way, it empowers the user to lower her energy bill (2b).
But the information the Google PowerMeter supplies focuses mainly on the
ﬁnancial aspects. Consequently, it runs the risk of hiding the environmental impacts
from view (2a). This would not be a problem if no revenge effects were to be
expected. From experience with the energy saving light bulb (see introduction), we
can conclude that an exclusive focus on the ﬁnancial aspects might perversely
increase the energy consumption, for example when it becomes clear that certain
applications are relatively cheap and people can afford to increase the use (2b). And
how will people behave when they observe that the energy becomes cheaper per
kWh (2b)? Currently, many people do not know how much energy different devices
use: they do not have the knowledge to be responsible. The PowerMeter makes
these people responsible, but with a strong focus on the economic aspects, and not
on the environmental issues (2c).
The third row of questions is about contingency, freedom and virtue. Energy bills
have long been events that happened only once a year, Google argues. The Google
PowerMeter aims to provide people with insight into their energy use on a daily
basis. Energy bills do no longer happen to them, but they can be in control of the
amount of the invoice (3a). Consequently, people’s freedom will increase since they
will have more information available. But this is not the complete picture: other
people can meddle in your energy decisions. Due to a novel form of—technolog-
ically enabled—social pressure, people might feel less free to act differently (3b).
Last, people who use considerably less energy than their friends or family may ﬁnd
themselves tempted to start using more energy since the PowerMeter convinces them
that they do not have to be ‘‘more Catholic than the Pope’’ (3c).
How can the programmers of Google take responsibility for the technological
mediation? Taking responsibility for designing the mediating role of technologies in
real life is not about liability: we do not want to discuss blame and shame. Neither
are we planning to blame Google if the software turns out to also have unforeseen
social impacts. But what we aim for is that actors apply their human capacity of
moral imagination to explore what the mediating role of their technology might be,
and to evaluate the question of whether this mediation contributes to human and
environmental ﬂourishing. Taking responsibility in the case of the Google
PowerMeter would entail studying not only whether the information provided by
the software is correct. Actors should also consider the desirability of the
technological mediation.
What can people do to take this responsibility seriously? In some cases, it is
relatively easy to adjust the design. For instance, the programmers of the Google
PowerMeter could consider not only informing users in terms of dollars but also on
expected CO2 reduction. But other issues ask for a more intersubjective approach,
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responsibility may involve for instance that the scientists and engineers ask for help
and present their designs and ideas in a transparent and morally assessable manner
to a discussion group.
Even if it is not sure what the social role of the emerging technology might be (as
is the case with many emerging technologies), a forward looking responsibility
should be taken in the sense that professionals should at least work to understand
what the social role might be. In some cases, pilot studies, discussions and realistic
moral imagination may provide us with some answers (Waelbers forthcoming). The
above mentioned possible social impact of the Google PowerMeter can for instance
be studied in pilots (in which controlled groups of potential users are testing the
functions) and in simulation studies (for instance the effects of an unexpected
inclination of the energy prices).
In many cases, parts of the social role will remain opaque, regardless of which
studies are performed. But the simple fact that we will never be absolutely sure does
not mean we should just stop thinking about how we can realize what we consider to
be a desirable social role. The fact that we never know at the beginning what the
results of a techno-scientiﬁc project will be, does not imply that scientists and
engineers should refuse to take up the challenge. The same should hold for the
social role of technologies: even though we can never be sure what the social role
will be, that does not mean that we should not try to develop the new technologies in
such a manner that the social role will be desirable. This might even be a prudent
stance for scientists and engineers, since a desirable social role is likely to smooth
the introduction of an invention in society.
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